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can tell us what basic justice in education requires in measurable terms. I highlight two core
commitments that Anderson and Satz share: a commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism and
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INTRODUCTION

Justice in education is an elusive notion. It is widely agreed upon that educational
opportunities should be distributed according to principles of justice, but there is little agreement
on which principles of justice are appropriate.1 One principle that should play a role in a complete
theory of justice in education is the principle of educational adequacy. The principle of educational
adequacy demands that every student have a sufficient education. There are two leading accounts
of the principle of educational adequacy. One of these accounts is given by Elizabeth Anderson 2
and the other by Debra Satz.3 On both accounts, an education is only adequate if it prepares
students for equal citizenship. Anderson focuses on the consequences of adopting a principle of
educational adequacy for students likely to take up elite positions in society, and Satz focuses on
the consequences for ordinary citizens. Anderson argues that adequacy requires that the school
system should be arranged such that the elite is composed of people from all walks of life, and
qualified to respond to and serve the needs of the worse-off in society. Satz argues that adequacy
requires that all citizens achieve a set of competencies necessary for basic civil and political
equality, and for obtaining a level of economic welfare sufficient for equal citizenship.
Although there is much to admire about Anderson’s and Satz’s views, they have at least
two problems. First, they are insufficiently value-pluralist.4 In their arguments for educational
adequacy, Anderson and Satz both criticize several interpretations of educational equality, and
they suggest that the principle of adequacy is a better alternative to the principle of equality

For an overview of theories of justice in education, see Liam Shields, Anne Newman and Debra Satz, “Equality of
Educational Opportunity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
2
Elizabeth Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117 (July 2007):
595-622.
3
Debra Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” Ethics 117 (July 2007): 623-648.
4
See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. “Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy: A Critique of Anderson
and Satz.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009): 117-128.
1
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outright. The principle of educational equality requires that all students have an equal education,
and it admits of many interpretations. While theorists largely agree that no single interpretation of
the principle of educational equality can yield a complete theory of justice in education, it is not
obvious that the principle of educational equality should be wholly supplanted by the principle of
educational adequacy.5 In the words of Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “[j]ustice … demands
adequacy, but it also demands equality—even if those demands must sometimes be balanced
against each other, and against other demands it makes.”6 Second, Anderson’s and Satz’s views
do not specify a metric of justice. That is, Anderson’s and Satz’s views do not explicitly include a
mechanism for tracking progress towards educational adequacy. A metric of justice is important
for setting meaningful thresholds for educational achievement and making interpersonal
comparisons in terms of educational achievements and opportunities.
In this paper, I revise the principle of educational adequacy in order to address these
problems. I argue that although the principle of educational adequacy cannot be the only principle
in a complete theory of educational justice, it can tell us what basic justice in education requires
in measurable terms. I do this in two parts. In the first part, I highlight two core commitments that
Anderson and Satz share: a commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism and 2) sufficientarian
equal citizenship. I argue that these commitments suffice to justify three essential demands for
basic justice in education: the comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of
minimum thresholds of educational achievement (commensurate with adequate opportunities for
all), and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. Then, I

5

For a statement of the problems with different formulations of the principle of educational equality, see Christopher
Jencks, “Whom Must We Treat Equally for Educational Opportunity to Be Equal?” Ethics 98, no. 3 (April 1988):
518-533.
6
Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy,” 118.
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reformulate these commitments in a way that appropriately accounts for the role that other
egalitarian values have to play in a complete theory of justice in education.
In the second part, I address the lack of a metric of justice in Anderson’s and Satz’s views.
I claim that progress towards educational adequacy can be measured using the capabilities
approach—an approach to measuring social injustice and inequality in terms of what people can
be and do.7 The capabilities approach states that basic justice requires societies to furnish every
person with a set of basic capabilities to function in ways consistent with a good human life.8
Conceiving of educational opportunities and achievements in terms of the capabilities necessary
for equal citizenship makes it possible to set meaningful thresholds for basic educational
achievement, and measure progress towards them in a concrete way. I conclude by addressing two
potential objections and suggesting directions for future study.
2

THE TWO CORE COMMITMENTS OF EDCUATIONAL ADEQUACY

In this section, I examine two core commitments in Anderson’s and Satz’s views of
educational adequacy: the commitment to 1) democratic egalitarianism, and 2) a sufficientarian
conception of equal citizenship. I argue that these commitments suffice to yield three essential
demands for basic justice education, and I modify them to account for other egalitarian values.
This section is divided into three subsections. In the first subsection, I locate the commitment to
democratic egalitarianism in Anderson’s and Satz’s views. Then, I show how the commitment
supports essential demands for basic justice in education. Finally, I modify the commitment to
account for other egalitarian values. In the second subsection, I repeat this procedure for the

7

For an overview of the capabilities approach, see Ingrid Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
8
Not all capabilities theorists subscribe to this view. Some capabilities theorists do not propose an account of basic
justice or specify a list of basic capabilities. For a concise discussion of this distinction in capability theory, see Martha
C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach, (Cambridge:The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2011): 19.
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commitment to a sufficientarian conception of equal citizenship. In the third subsection, I briefly
discuss the role these commitments have to play in a theory of educational justice.
2.1

Democratic Egalitarianism
2.1.1

Democratic Egalitarianism in Anderson’s and Satz’s Views

The first commitment that Anderson and Satz share is a commitment to a view of
democratic egalitarianism. This commitment is easiest to locate in Anderson’s view, because she
gives a comprehensive argument for an account of democratic egalitarianism in her 1999 paper,
“What Is the Point of Equality?”9 In that account, Anderson claims democratic egalitarians assert
two central positions, one negative and one positive. Negatively, democratic egalitarians aim to
end oppressive social relations. For Anderson, oppressive social relations are “forms of social
relationship by which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence
on others,” often on the basis of “differences in socially ascribed identities, distinct roles in the
division of labor, or differences in personal traits”10 Positively, democratic egalitarians aim to
create a social order in which people can stand in relations of equality.11 This aim amounts to a
call for “a democratic community, rather than a hierarchical one.” 12 For Anderson, a democratic
community is established and maintained through an open discussion among equals, where all are
entitled to participation, and where everyone recognizes an obligation to listen and respond to the
arguments of others without requiring deference of anyone.
Together, these two aims amount to a call for equal citizenship. In a society of equal
citizens, all citizens stand in relations of equality, and there are no oppressive social relations. Of

Elizabeth Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109, no. 2 (January 1999): 287-337
Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” 313.
11
Ibid., 312-5.
12
Ibid., 313.
9
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course, the commitment to democratic equality is rather vague unless it is supplemented with a
precise notion of equal citizenship. For Anderson and Satz, this notion is sufficientarian equal
citizenship, which will be covered in the next subsection. However, the basic idea of democratic
equality is enough to support demands for integration and minimum thresholds of educational
achievement. It is instructive to consider how Anderson and Satz argue for these demands.
Anderson invokes her own notion of democratic equality to argue for the integration of the
school system.13 Anderson’s view of educational adequacy considers the implications of a
commitment to democratic equality for students with high levels of educational opportunity and
achievement. She argues that in a democratic society of equal citizens, one major public good that
flows from education is a “democratic elite,” a group of individuals who are uniquely qualified to
hold especially demanding positions in political and civil society.14 On Anderson’s view, the
democratic elite must be constituted in a way that protects and upholds equal democratic
citizenship. On this basis, democratic egalitarians require “responsiveness to and effective service
of the interests of people from all sectors of society” from the democratic elite.15 If the democratic
elite is not responsive to the needs of all, then they fail to meet their obligation to listen and respond
to the arguments of others in society. Moreover, if the democratic elite do not use their positions
of power to effectively serve the interests of others, then their power over others is unjustified,
and the social structure resembles that of an inegalitarian hierarchy rather than a democracy.
A democratic elite is only capable of the responsiveness that justifies their power over
others if they meet four qualifications as a group: “(i) an awareness of the interests and problems

The subtitle of Anderson’s paper on this topic is “A Democratic Equality Perspective.” While she is not always
explicit about the connections between her account of democratic equality and her account of fair opportunity in
education, it is safe to say the latter is influenced heavily by the former.
14
Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 596.
15
Ibid.
13
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of people from all sectors and (ii) a disposition to serve those interests … (iii) technical knowledge
of how to advance these interests and (iv) competence in respectful interaction with people from
all sectors.”16 Anderson convincingly argues that qualifications (i), (ii), and (iv) are distributed
throughout the population and cannot be obtained in an academic setting. The only way the class
of democratic elites can meet these qualifications is if it is rigorously integrated across lines of
race, class, and gender. Working backwards from this requirement, Anderson’s commitment to
democratic equality entails that the K-12 school system be integrated across the same lines.17
Satz uses her commitment to democratic equality to argue for both the integration of the
school system and for minimum thresholds of educational achievement. Like Anderson, Satz
argues that “[e]ducational adequacy … is tied to the requirements of equal citizenship.18 However,
Satz departs from Anderson by considering the implications of a commitment to democratic
egalitarianism for people who are not likely to join the democratic elite. She relates educational
adequacy to equal citizenship in a way that reflects both positive and negative democratic
egalitarian aims. Satz takes up the positive aim of promoting relations of equality by arguing that
education should foster positive egalitarian attitudes like mutual understanding, mutual respect,
and tolerance.19 In Satz’s view, these attitudes are “group achievements, best accomplished
through the presence of diverse individuals.”20 Thus Satz, like Anderson, calls for integrative
measures in the K-12 school system.
Satz takes up the negative aim of opposing oppressive social relations by arguing that
educational opportunity inequalities that “relegate some members of society to second-class

Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 596.
Ibid., 597.
18
Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 625.
19
Ibid., 637.
20
Ibid.
16
17
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citizenship,” are unacceptable.21 Here, Satz cautions against allowing a too large a gap in real
educational opportunities to open between groups of citizens.22 Satz reasons that if some students
have access to significantly fewer real educational opportunities than others, such that they cannot
plausibly reach a level of educational achievement adequate to make them capable of acting as
equal citizens in adulthood, their status as equal citizens is directly undermined by educational
inequalities. Inequalities of this kind are unjust because they are incompatible with democratic
equality. As a consequence, Satz holds that there should be minimum thresholds of educational
achievement that raise all students above second-class citizenship status.
2.1.2

Democratic Equality and Basic Justice in Education

Anderson’s and Satz’ arguments use a commitment to democratic equality to support two
demands for basic justice in education. First, the commitment to democratic egalitarianism justifies
the integration of the school system for the purpose of creating a responsive democratic elite and
for promoting egalitarian relations among ordinary citizens. It is important for the democratic elite
to be qualified, because democratic societies require some people to hold positions of power, and
those people should be qualified to do so. A segregated school system would necessarily produce
an unqualified democratic elite, because potential members of the elite can only achieve
competence in required skills like respectful interaction with people from all sectors of society if
they are educated in diverse settings. A society run by an unqualified elite is oppressive because
it assigns hierarchical ranks according to unjust criteria. However, democratic egalitarianism does
not justify school integration solely on the basis of its benefits for elites. Democratic egalitarianism
requires that students learn how to treat people from all walks of life with understanding, respect,

21
22

Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 638.
Ibid..
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and tolerance. One of the best ways to foster these abilities in students is to educate students from
all walks of life together.
Second, the commitment to democratic egalitarianism justifies a demand for a substantive
minimum threshold of educational achievement. Democratic egalitarians oppose oppressive social
relations. So, democratic egalitarians have reason to oppose a socially mandated course of
schooling that fails to prepare students for equal citizenship, instead relegating them to secondclass citizenship. As it stands, this demand is rather vague, but it is useful to recognize that it is
entailed by the democratic egalitarian view. Shortly, I will show how Anderson and Satz use the
idea of sufficientarian equal citizenship to give it substantial content.
2.1.3

A Value-Pluralist Formulation of the Commitment to Democratic Equality

These two demands—for integration and for a minimum threshold of educational
achievement—are essential to the idea of basic educational justice. However, these demands
should not be made to the total exclusion of other important egalitarian values. I propose a
modified formulation of the demand that explicitly accounts for other values:
Democratic Equality: For any educational opportunity X, X should be distributed
in a way that is most likely to promote equal citizenship. Here, equal citizenship is
promoted by any distributive choice that either prevents oppressive social relations
or aids in creating a social order in which people stand in relations of equality. If
these aims have been achieved to the extent that the conditions of basic justice
obtain, or if there is no reasonable way to distribute X to advance these aims further,
then the most appropriate available egalitarian principle should guide the
distribution of X.
This formulation of democratic equality supports demands for the integration of K-12 public
schools, and for a public education that avoids relegating students to the status of second-class
citizens. It also yields to other values under two conditions: when the conditions of basic justice
obtain, or when democratic egalitarian aims cannot be reasonably advanced by a change in the
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distribution of educational opportunities. In section 2.3, I will discuss the implications of these
conditions at length.
2.2

Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship
2.2.1

Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship in Anderson’s and Satz’s Views

The second commitment that Anderson and Satz share is a commitment to a sufficientarian
conception of equal citizenship.23 This commitment gives content to Anderson’s and Satz’s
democratic egalitarian aims. In general, a conception of equal citizenship is sufficientarian if it
holds that some person is an equal citizen with respect to others in society so long as they meet or
exceed certain sufficiency requirements. Satz states this commitment most concisely. In her view
of educational adequacy, Satz defines equal citizenship in terms of three sufficiency requirements.
Satz claims that person is an equal citizen when they “(1) have equal basic political rights and
freedoms … ; (2) have equal rights and freedoms within civil society … ; and (3) have equal rights
to a threshold of economic welfare.”24 This is the vision of equal citizenship included in Satz’s
commitment to democratic egalitarianism.
Satz does not fully specify the content of each of these sufficiency requirements, but she
does give some indication of what each includes. For her, basic political rights and freedoms
include “rights to speech and participation in the political process,” civil rights and freedoms
include “rights to own property, and to justice,” and the threshold of economic welfare must be
high enough to allow a citizen to “share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a
civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society.”25 That the content of these

This is my term. However, the term is based on Anderson’s use the language of sufficiency to describe her standard
of distribution for fair educational opportunity. See “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 614-620.
24
Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 636. She borrows these from the British sociologist
T.H. Marshall.
25
Ibid., Quoting T.H. Marshall from “share in the full” to “prevailing in society.”
23
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categories is incomplete is not a problem for Satz. While some political, civil, and economic rights
are universal, other no less necessary rights may be required to protect equal citizenship under
conditions specific to a particular society.
As before, Satz focuses on the implications of a commitment to sufficientarian equal
citizenship for the education of people unlikely to join the democratic elite. Satz holds that in
general, “[c]itizenship requires a threshold level of knowledge and competence for exercising its
associated rights and freedoms.”26 Importantly, Satz adds that “the empirical content of this
threshold itself depends on the distribution of skills and knowledge in the population as a whole.”27
For Satz, these two claims have important distributive implications. Taken together, these claims
require the public education system to furnish all students with the basic competencies necessary
for political and civil equality and accessing an adequate level of economic welfare. The kinds and
degrees of competency required for meeting the threshold of basic equality in these domains are
determined by prevailing social and material conditions. Although her focus is on ordinary
citizens, Satz also mentions that “[c]itizens are not equal when there is a closed intergenerational
elite,” and her “conception of adequacy … does require that everyone with the potential have
access to the skills needed for college.”28
Anderson relies on a similar account of equal citizenship, which she gives in her account
of democratic equality. In that account, Anderson claims that equal citizenship obtains when each
citizen in a society reaches certain thresholds of capability “as a human being, as a participant in
a system of cooperative production, and as a citizen of a democratic state.”29 The content of her
conception of equal citizenship does not differ substantially from Satz’s. Anderson holds that “to

Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 636.
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 638.
29
Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, 317.
26
27
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be capable of functioning as a human being requires effective access to the means of sustaining
one’s biological existence,” “to be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of
cooperative production requires” a number of economic rights that amount to (at least) a threshold
of economic welfare,” and “to be capable of functioning as a citizen requires rights to political
participation … and also effective access to the goods and relationships of civil society.” 30 Like
Satz, Anderson does not fully specify these sufficiency requirements and allows that they may
vary across time and place. However, she is committed to the fundamental idea that in all societies,
basic justice requires each citizen to be capable of sufficient functioning as a human being, an
equal participant in collective production, and an equal in civil and political domains.
Anderson sets her sufficiency standard for fair educational opportunity with an eye towards
integrating the democratic elite. Anderson’s sufficiency standard requires that “members of all
social groups must have effective access to a primary and secondary education sufficient to qualify
them for success at a four-year residential college with such a curriculum.”31 Anderson defines
effective access as “within the realistic reach of students exercising substantial but not
extraordinary effort and within the financial reach of their families.”32 For Anderson, educational
opportunities have been distributed in a way that protects equal citizenship so long as citizens from
all social groups have a chance to obtain the academic qualifications needed to join the democratic
elite. Although her focus is on elites, Anderson also briefly argues that an adequate level of
achievement is important for everyone. Like Satz, she claims that the requirements of equal
citizenship “set a minimum threshold of acceptable educational outcomes that varies with the
general level of attainment in society.”33

Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?”, 317-8.
Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 614.
32
Ibid., 614-5.
33
Ibid., 620.
30
31
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2.2.2

Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship and Basic Justice in Education

Anderson’s and Satz’s arguments show how the commitment to sufficientarian equal
citizenship—in conjunction with the commitment to democratic equality—justifies two important
demands for basic justice in education. First, these commitments jointly require that every citizen
must be furnished with a threshold level of political, civic, and economic capability. Second, these
commitments jointly require that students from all social groups must have effective access to a
course of education that sufficiently prepares them to enter into a program (such as a four-year
residential college) where they can obtain the qualifications required for work in the democratic
elite.
It is also worth noting that these commitments have a consequence many egalitarians
dislike. These commitments allow that students can exceed the adequacy threshold to the extent
that the equal citizenship of others is not under threat. In Anderson’s and Satz’s formulations of
the principle of adequacy, this is an important allowance. Both Anderson and Satz argue that
families with different tastes for education should be allowed to raise their children in accordance
with those tastes.34 They also argue that the intrinsic good of education outweighs the inequalities
that might flow from above-threshold differences in educational achievement and opportunities.35
It is not obvious that either claim is true without qualification, and I leave the question open as to
whether they are. A fully specified conception of justice in education will contain the principles

See Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615; Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 634. Here,
Anderson and Satz both have in mind guardians who bear the costs of providing above-threshold education to their
children by, in the words of Anderson on 615, “using their own private resources or by demanding that their public
schools provide more.” Neither seems to have in mind families whose taste for education is below the threshold, as
may be the case for certain religious communities like the Amish. It is not obvious to me how Anderson or Satz would
handle this case. On my view, what counts as an adequate education for, e.g., an Amish child, would have to be
understood in the context of the long negotiation between the Amish community and the democratic society in which
they are situated. Families without religious objections or other potentially plausible appeals to relevant egalitarian
values would have no choice but to educate their children at least up to the point of adequacy, regardless of their
tastes.
35
See Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615; Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 634.
34
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necessary to guide the distribution of educational opportunities once adequacy has been achieved,
and my formulation of democratic equality allows those principles (whatever they are) to play their
proper role. I take no position on the principles that ought to regulate above-threshold inequalities.
In my view, the principle of educational adequacy is best suited to justify demands for rectifying
below-threshold levels of educational achievement.
However, I do find it important to acknowledge the possibility of below-threshold
inequalities. Anderson’s and Satz’s views say little about the fact that it may be impossible for
some students to attain all of the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship in virtue of certain
impairments they have. In my view, while it is the general case that a democratic society is
obligated to furnish every citizen with a threshold level of political, civic, and economic capability,
I allow that ought implies can. Every citizen of a democratic society deserves the real opportunity
to attain as many capabilities necessary for adequate functioning as an equal citizen in that society
as are possible for them in a manner that respects their dignity and humanity. If a school cannot
actually bring a student up to the desired level of capability despite using all reasonable means of
accommodation available, then the principle of educational adequacy has not been violated.
2.2.3

A Value-Pluralist Formulation of the Commitment to Sufficientarian Equal
Citizenship

Educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice. Whatever justice requires regarding the
distribution of education, it must condemn inadequacy. Rather than making claims about the
regulation of above-threshold inequalities, my formulation of sufficientarian equal citizenship
reflects this more modest position:
Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship: A citizen C is considered an equal citizen with
respect to others in society if C has 1) equal political rights and sufficient
capabilities to exercise them, 2) equal civil rights and sufficient capabilities to
exercise them, and 3) access a threshold of economic welfare that is consistent with
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a) meeting basic human biological needs and b) a dignified existence as defined
with respect to the standards of living prevalent in society. As a matter of basic
justice, a democratic society must furnish C with all capabilities necessary for equal
citizenship in virtue of their membership in that society. A democratic society is
not obligated to furnish C with any capability that C cannot attain when supported
with all appropriate accommodations that can reasonably be made available to C.
In conjunction with the commitment to democratic equality, this formulation of sufficientarian
equal citizenship supports demands for thresholds of educational achievement that correspond with
the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship. This formulation also supports demands for
effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. In addition, this
formulation uses the language of capability, which supports the metric of justice I introduce in
section 3. For now, it is enough to think of a citizen’s capabilities as everything that they can be
and do using the means already at their disposal. Finally, this formulation reflects my position that
educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice.
2.3

The Principle of Educational Adequacy and Full Educational Justice
In the foregoing subsections, I have provided the following reformulations of the two core

commitments of Elizabeth Anderson’s and Debra Satz’s educational adequacy views:
Democratic Equality: For any educational opportunity X, X should be distributed
in a way that is most likely to promote equal citizenship. Here, equal citizenship is
promoted by any distributive choice that either prevents oppressive social relations
or aids in creating a social order in which people stand in relations of equality. If
these aims have been achieved to the extent that the conditions of basic justice
obtain, or if there is no reasonable way to distribute X to advance these aims further,
then the most appropriate available egalitarian principle should guide the
distribution of X.
Sufficientarian Equal Citizenship: A citizen C is considered an equal citizen with
respect to others in society if C has 1) equal political rights and sufficient
capabilities to exercise them, 2) equal civil rights and sufficient capabilities to
exercise them, and 3) access a threshold of economic welfare that is consistent with
a) meeting basic human biological needs and b) a dignified existence as defined
with respect to the standards of living prevalent in society. As a matter of basic
justice, a democratic society must furnish C with all capabilities necessary for equal
citizenship in virtue of their membership in that society. A democratic society is
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not obligated to furnish C with any capability that C cannot attain when supported
with all appropriate accommodations that can reasonably be made available to C.
I have shown that these two commitments support three essential demands for basic justice in
education: the comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of thresholds of
educational achievement that correspond with the capabilities necessary for equal citizenship, and
effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups.
I have also modified these commitments from Anderson’s and Satz’s formulations in four
important ways. First, I have adjusted the commitment to democratic equality to explicitly allow
for value-pluralism. Second, I have incorporated the language of capability into the sufficientarian
conception of equal citizenship to allow for the metric of justice I introduce in section 3. Third, I
have changed the commitment to sufficientarian equal citizenship to reflect my claim that
educational adequacy is a matter of basic justice. Fourth, I have acknowledged that the
commitment to sufficientarian equal citizenship allows for below-threshold inequalities when
citizens with impairments who are given all appropriate and reasonable accommodations cannot
meet the adequacy threshold. Here, I will remark briefly on the implications of the first and third
modifications.
My formulation of the commitment to democratic equality allows for other values to guide
the distribution of educational opportunities under two conditions: 1) where the conditions of basic
justice obtain or 2) when democratic egalitarian aims cannot be reasonably advanced. The wording
of both of these conditions is intentionally broad. Regarding the first condition, it is an open
question what basic justice in education requires. I maintain that basic justice in education requires
adequacy, but I allow that it may require more. Regarding the second condition, what constitutes
a genuine barrier to the reasonable advancement of egalitarian aims is subject to debate. If either
condition is met, it will not always be obvious what other egalitarian principle to invoke. It is
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important for my view that what it takes to meet all of these conditions be left open to some
interpretation. A fully specified theory of justice in education will have to grapple with complex
situations, and my formulation of the commitment to democratic equality is flexible in recognition
of this fact.
Although my formulation of the commitment to democratic equality is open to some
interpretation, it can still provide the guidance needed to resolve important issues. For illustrative
purposes, consider two clear cases—one involving barriers to the reasonable achievement of
democratic egalitarian aims, and another in which basic justice obtains. First, suppose that in a
rural community with relatively homogenous demographics, the only way to integrate the school
system immediately would be to bus students for six hours each day to a school in the nearest
city.36 Logistics and cost aside, this would be unreasonable. Such a policy would make it
practically impossible for parents and their children form relationships with one another. The
parent-child relationship is not centrally valued by democratic egalitarians, but no reasonable
democratic egalitarian would wish to compromise it entirely. In this case, even though the principle
of educational adequacy would require busing, the injustice that busing would do to the parents
and children involved would obviously outweigh the injustice that busing would redress.
Resources would be better spent on policies and practices that would bring about integration in
that rural community in the long-run.
Now consider a case in which education reform has had nationwide success, and all of the
conditions of basic justice have been met.37 All students have adequate educational opportunities,
people who complete the publicly mandated course of schooling do not have to worry about

This case is inspired by a similar example given in Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational
Adequacy,” 121.
37
This case is inspired by a similar example given in Brighouse and Swift, “Educational Equality versus Educational
Adequacy,” 125.
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consignment to second-class citizenship, the democratic elite is both rigorously integrated and
responsive to the needs of the worse off in society, and all other conditions of basic educational
justice have been met. If, under these circumstances, the legislature injected substantial additional
funding into the school system, democratic egalitarians would not be able to make precise
recommendations about how to distribute that funding. At this point, other egalitarian principles
would be better suited to guide the distribution of resources. For instance, with adequacy soundly
achieved, it might be appropriate to invoke principles of educational equality to distribute a
windfall of additional resources. Under my formulation of the commitment to democratic
egalitarianism, this is not a problem, so long as those other principles do not skew the distribution
of resources in a way that promotes oppressive social relations.
My formulation of sufficientarian equal citizenship stipulates that educational adequacy is
a matter of basic justice. I also add that citizens are entitled to the capabilities necessary for equal
citizenship simply in virtue of their membership in society. Educational adequacy is not something
that citizens of a democratic society can choose to pass up—the commitment to a society of equal
citizens is vacuous unless every citizen is furnished with all of the actual capabilities to function
as an equal citizen that they are able to attain when appropriately accommodated.38 To be
inadequately educated is to be incapable of full membership in a democratic society. Basic social
justice requires that educational opportunities be distributed according to the principle of
educational adequacy. Every citizen of such a society must be adequately educated, except in
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It is possible and even likely that some students will refuse to learn or will forget the material they learned and thus
lose their capabilities over time. As I will discuss in the upcoming section, my formulation of educational adequacy
allows and sometimes requires a significant amount of paternalism to overcome student refusal to learn, especially at
a young age. Additionally, democratic egalitarians hold that the capabilities associated with equal citizenship are
guaranteed for life, meaning that adequacy requires people to have effective access to opportunities for continuing
education should their capabilities atrophy below the point of adequacy. However, ought implies can, and should all
warranted paternalism and actually accessible offers of continuing education fail to reach some students, the principle
of educational adequacy is not violated by their choice to abstain from equal citizenship.
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cases where capability deficits are justified by barriers to the reasonable achievement of
democratic egalitarian aims.
Before moving on to a discussion of capabilities as a metric of educational adequacy, it is
worth reflecting on the political value of this revised principle of educational adequacy. The
principle of educational adequacy draws on democratic values to support demands for
comprehensive integration of the school system, the setting of minimum thresholds of educational
achievement, and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups.
In the contemporary U.S., the school system is plagued by residential segregation,39 failing schools
relegate poor and racially marked students to second-class citizenship,40 and students from
disadvantaged social groups have limited access to opportunities for higher education.41 There are
significant legal barriers to exercising the principle of educational equality, including the U.S.
Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which states that
the constitution only guarantees students a right to an adequate education.42 The disadvantages that
some students face, and the unfair advantages that other students have, are only reinforced by the
activity of a closed, intergenerational, homogenous, and unresponsive elite.43
Under these circumstances, full educational justice seems impossibly far away—but the
principle of educational adequacy can help us understand what needs to be done to move towards

See, for example, Sean Reardon and Ann Owens, “60 Years After Brown: Trends and Consequences of School
Segregation,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 199-216.
40
See, for example, Eric A. Hanushek, John F. Kain, and Steven G. Rivkin, "New Evidence about Brown v. Board of
Education: The Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement," Journal of Labor Economics 27
no. 3 (July 2009): 349-383.
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See, for example, Stephen B. Billings, David J Deming, Jonah Rockoff, “School Segregation, Educational
Attainment, and Crime: Evidence from the End of Busing in Charlotte-Mecklenburg,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 129 no. 1 (2014): 435-476.
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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See, for example, Richard Reeves, Dream Hoarders: How the American Upper Middle Class Is Leaving Everyone
Else in the Dust, Why That is a Problem, and What to Do About It, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press,
2017).
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basic justice in education. However, the principle of educational adequacy is only as useful as its
demands are specific. The idea of sufficientarian thresholds for educational achievement is
appealing, but unless they can be expressed in terms of measurable units, the usefulness of the
principle of educational adequacy remains limited. The principle of educational adequacy requires
a metric of justice to make politically substantive demands.
3

EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

In this section, I claim that progress towards educational adequacy can be measured using
the capabilities approach—an approach to measuring social injustice and inequality in terms of
what people can be and do. Capability theorists hold that basic justice requires societies to furnish
every person with a set of basic capabilities to function in ways consistent with a good human
life.44 If we conceive of educational opportunities and outcomes in terms of the capabilities
necessary for equal citizenship, then we can set meaningful thresholds for basic educational
achievement, and measure progress towards them in a concrete way. This section is divided into
two subsections. In the first subsection, I provide background on the capabilities approach. In the
second subsection, I describe how the capabilities approach can work as a metric of justice for
educational adequacy.
3.1

The Capabilities Approach
The capabilities approach is “an approach to quality-of-life assessment and to theorizing

about basic social justice. It holds that the question to ask, when comparing societies and assessing
them for basic decency or justice, is “What is each person able to do and be?””45 The approach
was initially developed by the economist and philosopher Amartya Sen as an alternative measure
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Not all capabilities theorists endorse this view. See footnote 8 for details.
Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 19.
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for quality-of-life in developing economies.46 However, the approach has since been generalized
by Sen, Martha Nussbaum, and others, such that it can be used to measure inequality and test for
basic justice in a wide variety of contexts.
The capabilities approach includes a way to measure people’s freedom to achieve wellbeing, where this freedom is conceived of in terms of what people are actually able to be and do.47
The capabilities approach measures people’s freedom to achieve well-being in terms of their
functionings and capabilities.48 Sen succinctly defines functionings as a person’s “beings and
doings.”49 Put more explicitly, a person’s functionings consist of all of the states of being that
person achieves, and all of the things that person does. The term is intentionally broad, so that it
can capture the diverse ways in which people can realize (or fail to realize) their well-being. Some
examples of basic functionings include eating nutritious food, appearing in public without shame,
reading materials written in one’s native language, being a tolerated and accepted in one’s
community, and living in a safe home.
Capabilities are all of the functionings a person can actually achieve given their life
circumstances. A person’s capability set consists of all of the real opportunities that person has to
be and do different things.50 As a consequence, a person’s capability set is inclusive of and nearly
always larger than the set of all of the functionings they achieve. This is just to say that people can
be and do more than they in fact achieve. Capabilities theorists conceive of freedom in terms of
capabilities, because adults are free to refrain from exercising their capabilities to function. To
borrow an example from Sen, a starving person and a fasting person are both deficient in the same

For a rigorous statement of Sen’s approach to development economics, see Amartya Sen, Development as
Freedom, (New York: Anchor Books, 1999).
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Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, (New York: Sage Press, 1992): 39-55.
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functioning.51 Both are not eating. However, a fasting person is perfectly capable of eating, and
only refrains on principle. A starving person is not eating because they are not capable—they do
not have any real opportunities to eat. The capabilities approach would say that the starving person
has less freedom to achieve well-being than the fasting person, even if they are both equally
hungry. The fasting person has the real opportunity to eat, while the starving person does not. On
the capabilities view, the starving person does not have the freedom to fast.
The capabilities approach gives a rich account of human freedom, but it is only a partial
approach to theorizing about social justice.52 One consequence of this is that the capabilities
approach does not fully specify which capabilities societies have an obligation to equalize.
However, some capability theorists maintain that there exists a set of basic capabilities that
societies ought to equalize as a matter of basic justice.53 Elizabeth Anderson’s account of
democratic equality can be understood as one view of what those capabilities are. Since the revised
principle of educational adequacy takes on a commitment to democratic equality based on
Anderson’s, it is apt to measure progress towards educational adequacy in terms of capabilities.
3.2

Capabilities as a Metric of Justice for Educational Adequacy
The revised principle of educational adequacy sets thresholds for educational achievement

according to the requirements of democratic equality and sufficientarian equal citizenship. I argue
that these thresholds can be helpfully expressed in terms of capabilities. For example,
sufficientarian equal citizenship requires that as a matter of basic justice, all citizens of a
democratic society must have equal political rights and sufficient capabilities to exercise them.
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The commitment to democratic equality states that a citizen is insufficiently capable of exercising
their political rights if they cannot avoid oppressive social relations or cannot relate to others as an
equal. Under the guidance of these commitments, it is possible to specify a list of capabilities that
are necessary to exercise one’s political rights. Such a list might include capabilities like being
able to cast an informed vote, being able to communicate intelligibly in public forums, being able
to serve on a jury, being equipped with an understanding of how the government works, or being
able to understand and critically interpret the arguments of candidates for political offices.
Each of these capabilities require other capabilities, some of which are universal, and some
of which may be specific to particular social arrangements or individual conditions. For example,
being able to communicate intelligibly in public forums universally requires competence in a
publicly recognized language. However, other requirements for intelligible public communication
vary—important public discourse may take place in physical places, in written publications, or on
the internet. In some societies, a citizen may be sufficiently capable of intelligible public
communication when they are competent oral communicators in one language, while citizens in
other societies citizens may have to be competent in multiple languages, written language, or the
use of computers to achieve sufficiency. A fully specified list of the capabilities necessary for
equal citizenship will include all of the capabilities necessary for exercising political and civil
rights, and for achieving a threshold level of economic welfare, as specified in the commitment to
sufficientarian equal citizenship.
The resulting list will include a set of capabilities necessary for basic justice in education.54
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This list may also include capabilities that no amount of education can grant students because of broader political,
civil, or economic injustices. For example, if labor market discrimination excludes people with disabilities from work,
education alone may not be able to ensure that people with disabilities are capable of securing basic economic welfare.
Basic justice in education cannot resolve such discrimination, and educators are not obliged to do the impossible. In
such cases, educators are responsible for treating such students with equal dignity and getting them as close to the
relevant adequacy threshold(s) as possible.
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Recall that basic justice only requires that citizens achieve these capabilities up to a threshold level
set relative to the distribution of capabilities in society. This threshold must be set high enough
that every citizen who meets it is capable of avoiding oppressive social relations and relating to
others as an equal, but the principle of educational adequacy by itself gives no reasons for setting
the threshold any higher. Furthermore, basic justice in education does not require that each and
every citizen be furnished with a threshold level of these capabilities at all costs. In any case where
there are barriers to reasonably advancing democratic egalitarian aims, other values may justify
allowing below-threshold levels of achievement. In such cases, resources may be better spent on
long-term solutions that would eliminate such barriers.
Expressing adequacy thresholds for educational achievement in terms of capabilities has
several advantages. One advantage is that it gives content to the ideas of educational achievement
and educational opportunity. On this view, a student’s educational achievements are measured in
terms of the functionings they have demonstrated. Basic justice in education requires that each
student demonstrate that they are capable of functioning in all of the ways that the principle of
educational adequacy requires. Following the same line of reasoning, educational opportunities
are opportunities for students to achieve new functionings. On the capabilities approach, an
opportunity is understood to be a real chance to do something—if a person cannot do something
using the means already at their disposal, they do not have the opportunity to do it. So, on this
view, an educational opportunity is a chance for a student to achieve a new functioning using
means already at their disposal.55

Anderson uses this language to describe her concept of “effective access” in “What Is the Point of Equality,” 318.
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These understandings of educational opportunity and achievement come with two further
advantages. First, if an educational opportunity is a chance to achieve a new functioning using
means already at one’s disposal, then a significant amount of paternalism is permitted in providing
students with educational opportunities.56 For example, this conception of educational opportunity
would say that leaving a young child alone in a room full of books is not equivalent to giving that
child an opportunity to learn how to read. Giving a young child an opportunity to read requires
setting realistic targets for that child, and then ensuring that the child has the means to reach those
targets—like teaching them how to recognize letters and sound out words, and eventually asking
them to read small fragments of text out loud independently. On this conception of educational
opportunity, there is no sense in which young children can waste their opportunities to achieve
basic capabilities, because it is the responsibility of teachers to ensure that young children have
the means to achieve the functionings associate with those capabilities. Importantly, such high
levels of paternalism would not be warranted for older students. Insofar as older students are
capable of independent learning and self-motivation, the educational opportunities presented to
them ought to reflect the more advanced means to demonstrate new functionings that they have at
their disposal.
Second, since educational achievements are understood to be demonstrated functionings,
they can be measured in concrete terms. Tests of adequate educational achievement simply need
to measure students’ abilities to demonstrate a level of functioning consistent with a threshold level
of the capabilities associated with equal citizenship. This is perhaps the most important implication
of adopting capabilities as a metric of justice for educational adequacy. If the principle of

In “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” Satz raises the concern that “the language … of “opportunity” seems
misplaced in primary and at least part of secondary school education … we expect students to go o school and master
certain capabilities; it is not enough that they have the opportunities to do so” (631). I write with this concern in mind.
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educational adequacy can be used to generate a list of capability thresholds that students must meet
as a matter of basic justice, and progress towards those thresholds can be measured in terms of
functionings, then the principle of educational adequacy can be used to make highly specific
political demands. Although such demands will be for basic—rather than complete—educational
justice, basic educational justice in an urgent need in the U.S. and around the world.
For example, in the U.S., the principle of adequacy could be used to justify policy
interventions that reduce the unjust advantages that flow to students who are educated in elite
private schools. These policies would narrow the achievement gap between elite private school
students and public school students, which arguably relegates students in the lowest-performing
public schools to second-class citizenship. The exact content of such policy interventions would
be better determined by policy experts, but a system of private school vouchers granted to multiplydisadvantaged students would not be out of the question. There is a growing body of empirical
evidence that suggests that when disadvantaged students are granted vouchers that cover some or
all of the costs of attending high-performing private schools, their academic and long-term
outcomes improve.57 Such policies also have the potential to increase the diversity of private
schools, reduce educational opportunity hoarding on the part of the elite, and eventually contribute
to the integration of the elite. Of course, like all policies, targeted private school vouchers are not
without trade-offs and downsides. Still, they are a good example of the sort of intervention that the
principle of educational adequacy may serve to justify.
It is beyond the scope of my argument to provide a complete list of all of the demands,
changes, and policies that the principle of educational adequacy could support. However, as the
above example shows, the principle of educational adequacy can be used to make specific demands

For a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on these policies, see Dennis Epple et. al., “School Vouchers:
A Survey of the Economics Literature,” Journal of Economic Literature 55, no. 2 (2017): 441-493.
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for basic justice in education, and those demands can be met with the help of pragmatic,
empirically-supported policies. The capabilities metric gives social scientists and policymakers a
way to measure the success of such policies—in terms of the change in students’ ability to
demonstrate functionings associated with the capabilities essential for equal citizenship.
4

OBJECTIONS

In this paper, I have argued that although the principle of educational adequacy cannot be
the only principle in a complete theory of educational justice, it can tell us what basic justice in
education requires in measurable terms. First, I argued Elizabeth Anderson’s and Debra Satz’s
arguments for educational adequacy make two core commitments: a commitment to 1) democratic
egalitarianism, and 2) sufficientarian equal citizenship. I showed that these two commitments
suffice to justify three essential demands for basic justice in education: the comprehensive
integration of the school system, the setting of minimum thresholds of educational achievement,
and effective access to higher education for members of disadvantaged social groups. Then, I
reformulated these commitments to properly account for the role other values have to play in a
complete theory of educational justice. The resulting revised principle of educational adequacy
specifies what basic justice in education requires, but it does not regulate the distribution of
educational opportunities once the conditions of basic justice obtain. Second, I claim that the
sufficiency thresholds set by the revised principle of educational adequacy should be understood
in terms of capabilities. When sufficiency thresholds are understood in this way, progress towards
educational adequacy can be measured in concrete terms.
Compared to Anderson’s and Satz’s adequacy views, my view is rather modest. I claim
that the principle of educational adequacy can give us a partial picture of what educational justice
requires, and I argue that those requirements can be understood in terms of capabilities. In making
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this modest claim, I hope to account more carefully for the other values and principles that ought
to play a role in a complete theory of justice in education. However, this compromise invites at
least two objections. It could be argued that the primary obligation the principle of educational
adequacy entails—i.e., the obligation to furnish all students with a threshold level of capabilities
necessary for equal citizenship—is either too strong or too weak.
First, one could object that the obligation to furnish all students with basic capabilities is
too strong. One way the obligation could be too strong is if it requires too many resources to be
spent on bringing students with low levels of capability up to the adequacy thresholds. Consider,
for instance, the case of a student with severe learning disabilities, an unsupportive family, and
serious behavioral issues. It seems that it would be unreasonably costly to attempt to bring such a
student up to the requisite capability thresholds, and that such attempts might nonetheless fall short
in view of the limits imposed by the student’s impairments and family situation. In such a case,
the principle of educational adequacy only requires that this student be supported with all
reasonable and appropriate accommodations in order to bring them as close to the threshold as
possible. What counts as ‘reasonable’ will depend on the resources at the disposal of the school
where that student is being educated. The principle of adequacy does not require the impossible of
schools or educators—it just requires their best efforts.
Another way the obligation to furnish students with basic capabilities could be too strong
is if it would entail limiting the educational opportunities of high-aptitude students. If basic justice
in education requires reducing the achievement gap such that no student is relegated to secondclass citizenship, it may seem necessary to “level down” high-achieving students.58 My
formulation of the principle of educational adequacy does not require levelling down. On my view,

Anderson and Satz both oppose levelling down. See Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education,” 648, and Anderson
“Fair Opportunity in Education,” 615.
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basic justice in education is consistent with inequalities in educational achievement that are
justifiable according to democratic egalitarian principles. On these grounds, the principle of
educational adequacy requires integrating the school system and granting effective access to higher
education to members of disadvantaged social groups so that unequal levels of achievement are
likely to rebound to the benefit of the worse off. Levelling down would run contrary to these
purposes. It is an open question whether a fully specified theory of justice in education would
require levelling down, but the principle of educational adequacy does not in itself justify levelling
down.
The second kind of objection one could raise against my view is that the obligation to
furnish all students with basic capabilities is too weak. One case in which this obligation could be
too weak is if a student with disabilities is able to meet thresholds despite her impairments. Anita
Silvers and Michael Stein raise the case of the student Amy Rowley.59 Rowley is deaf, but she can
lip-read, and with the help of a hearing aid and some assistance in class, she was able to achieve
above average performance in school. However, she missed much of the material communicated
during instruction, and she would have been able to achieve at a higher level if she had a signlanguage interpreter in class. It seems like the principle of educational adequacy would say that
basic justice has been achieved in Rowley’s case, even though she was capable of higher
performance.
However, the commitment to democratic equality does entitle Rowley to a sign-language
interpreter (or equivalent). Recall that the positive aim of democratic egalitarians is to create a
society in which people can stand in relations of equality. This aim calls for a democratic
community that is established and maintained through an open discussion among equals, where all

Anita Silvers and Michael A. Stein, ‘Disability and the Social Contract,’ University of Chicago Law Review 74
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are entitled to participation, and where everyone recognizes an obligation to listen and respond to
the arguments of others without requiring deference of anyone. Although the commitment to
democratic egalitarianism requires specific thresholds of capability for justice in education, it also
has more wide-ranging implications for how people ought to be treated while they are in school.
The idea of civic equality is internal to the principle of educational adequacy, and civic equality
obliges schools to accommodate people like Amy Rowley such that they can listen and
communicate as equals.
Another way this obligation could be too weak is if it allowed schools to divert all new
resources to high-aptitude students once everyone is at- or above-threshold. The principle of
educational adequacy does not specify how to distribute educational opportunities once thresholds
have been met, and therefore it does not exclude this possibility when standing alone. However, I
hold that whenever conditions of basic justice obtain, other principles should guide the distribution
of educational opportunities. Basic justice is just that—basic. It should not be surprising that the
principle of educational adequacy does not make recommendations that are fully just. However,
following the recommendations of the principle of educational adequacy when basic justice does
not obtain will lead to greater justice in education.
5

CONCLUSION

I have made the case that the principle of educational adequacy can be used to concretize
many important requirements of basic educational justice. This is an important first step in
understanding the role that the principle of educational adequacy has to play in a fully specified
conception of educational justice, but much more work remains to be done. I conclude by
suggesting two possible directions for future study. First, while I claim that the principle of
educational adequacy has an essential role to play in determining the requirements of basic justice
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in education, it is not obvious that it is the only principle that should be involved. More work needs
to be done to determine what basic justice in education entails. A full conception of basic justice
in education would be of significant value to the project of developing a complete theory of
educational justice. Second, more work needs to be done to determine what other values it would
be unreasonable for democratic egalitarians to compromise in the pursuit of educational adequacy.
It is clear that there are cases in which this happens, and I allow that it can, but a more systematic
approach would do much to clarify what adequacy entails. Although there is more work to be done,
the project of understanding the principle of educational adequacy is worth pursuing. Whatever
justice in education requires, it condemn inadequacy.
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